If the Chinese Communist Party can carry out its threat to “unify” Taiwan by force, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army will need to mobilize millions of troops across the Taiwan Straits to have a chance to truly conquer Taiwan’s democracy.
Rugged and mountainous Taiwan has only 14 beaches suitable for amphibious attack, as assessed by the Virginia 2049 Planning Institute think tank. The People’s Liberation Army may choose to abandon its priority attack on the beaches and instead capture one or more of Taiwan’s many ports and use them to augment troops on the island.
“According to the internal investigation of the PLA, beaches and airports can even be considered auxiliary or support wings, while the nucleus, the fulcrum of the invasion of Taiwan, is the country’s own port,” wrote Ian Easton of the 2049 Project Research Institute A new sheet of paper.
If this is the plan, the PLA can target at least 10 major ports. Easton wrote: “The ideal candidate for the attack is a developed commercial or industrial port, flanked by beaches and river deltas in relatively flat and less urbanized areas.
A prominent. “Based on this description, Taichung Port seems to be the most likely location for the PLA’s main landing attempt.”
According to Easton, the PLA can seize Taichung in a variety of ways. Taichung is located on the west coast of Taiwan, only 100 miles from mainland China. . None of them are easy.
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Taichung is located near several large Taiwan military bases. A ridge occupies the port from the southeast, providing an ideal location for the defenders to open fire on the invading Chinese army from there. Easton wrote that Taichung “may be well defended.
“Sources predict that the Taiwanese military will turn their ports into wartime defensive fortresses and surround them with a network of interconnected firing positions,” Easton explained.
According to the writings of the Chinese military, the center of every Taiwan port will be defended by ground forces concentrated in well-prepared and shielded defense projects, which may include underground shelters and tunnel systems. These points can be located near ports, cranes, command centers, and piers of communication nodes.
These imaginary fortresses will be guarded from above by Taiwanese infantry units in companies and platoons deployed at firing positions overlooking the surrounding city buildings in the harbor.
observers, snipers and air defense forces will occupy the roof positions. Tanks, armored combat vehicles, coastal artillery, and heavy artillery will be hidden in “near infrastructure.” This term may include warehouse locations, empty factories, artificial tunnels, improved natural caves, and under bridges. Assume that the
defenders will be located in the prepared defensive positions near the beaches on both sides of the port entrance, as well as on the top of the hill overlooking the port, near traffic intersections, and other defensive positions.
But since occupying Taichung or other ports is safer for invading forces than for traditional attacks on beaches, it may be worth the risk that Beijing invests a large part of its military power on this issue.
Attackers have multiple options. “The first method is to let the PLA Navy’s secret ships transport mobile infantry units to Taiwan’s ports through normal shipping lanes, and use amphibious landing ships or ro-ro/cargo ships to land directly at the docks. Roll-off,” Easton wrote. “The attackers will unload the cargo, cross the port area and occupy the surrounding urban areas.
Alternatively, amphibious forces can land near the port and try to seize it from the outside in. “The obvious advantage of this method is that it can work when the ports of Taiwan are fully defended; in fact, in this case, the PLA researchers estimate that the flanks of the port may be the best use of the weakness.”
If planning The author thinks it is amphibious Landing is impractical or too risky. Attackers can attempt to use helicopters, hovercraft, and ground-effect vehicles to occupy the harbor in a “sea slide” raid. Easton wrote: “A sea skid attack is evaluated as the most suitable for a weak port or a port where the defender has been destroyed by a missile attack prior to the attack.”
Parachutes or Airassault helicopters are another option. Easton explained: “Attackers can get unexpected elements and get into the weaker defensive area from behind the defender’s defense line.” “They will avoid the ‘hard shell’ prepared by the Taiwanese military around the port area and will be able to move quickly to create chaos and avoid violent fire. Chapter
The Attacker Must Avoid Causing Too Much Damage “If ports are destroyed in battle because the defender destroyed them, or because we severely damaged them in the course of our operations to seize them, then there is no point in occupying these ports,” Easton said. A People’s Liberation Army study noted.
The Taiwanese government certainly understands that a destroyed port is a useless port for Chinese attackers, Easton noted. “As a last resort, it is believed that the Taiwanese military will blow up its docks, cranes, power plants, fuel depots, water supply lines, causeways and other port infrastructure when it withdraws to surrounding cities, thereby denying the port of the intruder”.
In this sense, Taichung and other strategic ports are actually more valuable to China than to Taiwan.
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By Peter

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